Trauma, emotions and memory in world politics: The case of the European Union’s foreign policy in the Middle East conflict by Michelle Pace (7187264) & Ali Bilgic (3591167)
Accepted Version 
1 
 
Trauma, Emotions and Memory in World Politics: 
The Case of the European Union’s Foreign Policy 
in the Middle East Conflict 
 
Michelle Pace and Ali Bilgic 
 
Accepted for Publication in Political Psychology (September 2017) 
 
Introduction 
Recent methodological innovations in the discipline of International Relations 
(IR),have produced plausible and practical ways to study emotions (Bleiker and 
Hutchison, 2008; Hutchison, 2016: 160; Mercer, 1997; Sasley, 2011; Schilling, 
2015). Following these openings, this article examines how emotions impact on the 
foreign policy practices of agents, such as institutions, in world politics. In particular, 
the link between emotions and the ways in which past traumatic experiences are 
remembered is explored with reference to the EU’s identity and agency vis-à-vis the 
Israeli-Palestinian  conflict. It will be argued that the EU representatives’ emotional 
performances in relation to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict can be understood as a 
technique of expressing what the EU stands for to others against the backdrop of a 
shared traumatic history. In other words, the ‘memory of trauma’, which refers to past 
traumatic experiences that are institutionalised and instrumentalised in the process 
of identity construction in the present, is translated into a foreign policy practice 
through emotional performances of EU representatives. 
The analysis starts with a conceptual discussion about how emotions can be studied 
in global politics in the context of traumatic pasts. We argue that emotions - as 
conscious representations of feelings by individuals - construct collective identities 
and shape the agency of institutions by enacting the memory of trauma. In particular, 
we draw upon Hutchison (2016) and Bially Mattern’s (2011) analytical frameworks, 
which provide us with crucial pointers on what emotions are, how they affect politics, 
and specifically, world politics. We complement our investigation with Sara Ahmed’s 
(2004) work which sheds light on how emotions are felt, enacted, performed, and 
projected depending on historically constructed political contexts. In the second 
section, we examine the EU representatives’ emotional performances in relation to 
the conflict.  
Our empirical work is based on ethnographic research carried out by one of the 
authors over a number of years in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories and 
Brussels (at the European External Action Service/Council, the Commission and the 
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European Parliament). The time period of this ethnographic research spans over 
thirteen years: from January 2004 up to the most recent field trip conducted during 
October 2016. (All field trips by the said author have been connected to specific 
research grant projects funded by the EU, the ESRC, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and 
the Carlsberg foundation). Working as a field researcher in a highly conflictual and 
polarized setting entails a number of ethical and emotional challenges. Most 
interviews, focus groups (maximum of 6 participants per group) and observations 
were held in English amongst Palestinians, Israelis and EU officials including EU 
member states officials on the ground in the conflict area. Throughout the said 
research, care was taken to ensure a balanced representation of subjects in relation 
to gender, class, educational background, etc. Focus groups were held with youth, 
academic, business and NGO groups. Interviews were mainly held with 
officials/elitegroups.  All these qualitative methods took place with the fully informed 
consent of the research subjects. In such highly sensitive research the anonymity of 
those interviewed/observed and the confidentiality of the data gathered were 
ensured to the extent possible. 
Before the discussions that follow below, three clarifications are in order. First, as 
emotions are inextricably linked to individuals, by the EU, we mean the EU’s official 
representatives who embody what the EU stands for and how it is represented in its 
external affairs. In the EU’s foreign policy literature, the impact of emotions on the 
EU’s foreign policy actorness, defined as ‘the capacity to behave actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’  (Sjöstedt 1977: 16) 
and agency in terms of affecting structural processes and relations through its 
representatives remain, to say the least, severely understudied. This article aims to 
fill this gap by nuancing the role of emotions in the EU’s foreign policy as well as how 
these emotions impact on the EU’s international identity and agency in relation to 
one of the most emotionally loaded, prolonged conflicts by focusing on the narratives 
of EU representatives in the Israel-Palestinian context. Secondly, we take trauma not 
at the individual level as an unconscious experience but at a collective level, which is 
always public and instrumental to a policy goal, and a matter of public discourse 
(Becker: 2014: 63). The focus of our discussions is not a particular traumatic event 
experienced by an EU collective of officials or representatives but rather how the 
traumatic past is remembered and enacted politically and publicly. Thirdly, we 
acknowledge that not all EU member states may necessarily share the same 
national mythologies about these events (for more on the emotional appeal of 
European myths see Lynggard, 2016). Yet, what brings the EU collective together in 
this context are the shared experiences of past traumatic processes and what we 
want to shed light on is the way in which these emotions are performed. 
Emotional Performances in International Relations: Enacting the memory of 
trauma 
Constructivist and poststructuralist/postmodernist turns in IR enabled the study of 
memory in world politics. World Wars and the holocaust (Zehfuss, 2007), the 
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Vietnam War and 9/11 (Edkins, 2003), the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the 
subsequent wars (Ray, 2006), the apartheid regime in South Africa and truth and 
reconciliation committees established - in the course of ‘healing’ and ‘dealing with 
the past’ (Meskell, 2006), and through the use of memory in foreign policy practices 
(Becker, 2014; Sasley, 2014) – an analytically scrutinized space within the IR 
domain. 
While the studies of memory reveal the political, highly selective, and productive role 
of the past in the reproduction of the present and the future, a particular mnemonic 
moment has attracted overwhelming attention from IR scholars: trauma.Like 
memory, trauma is a ‘messy’ concept. It is highly individualistic and evokes feelings 
of helplessness, pain and confusion – at the same time as it is collective (Herman, 
2015). In addition, trauma often goes beyond the limits of language: feelings that are 
experienced because of trauma cannot be easily expressed within the existing 
language systems (Edkins, 2003; Hutchison, 2016). That is why, as will be shown 
below, ‘speechlessness’ is a common expression in the face of a traumatic 
event.Yet, trauma is still communicated through individuals’ own attempts and 
struggles to express their  own traumatic past. However, the present analysis 
focuses on how a traumatic past is remembered today as a political project, as 
studies of trauma in IR have powerfully shown. In this way, traumas, or ‘memories of 
trauma’ (Edkins, 2006: 100) have become part of culture. Fierke (2006: 121) 
explains as follows: 
The literal experience of trauma may be beyond representation, but in the imitation 
or acting out of the traumatic event, the victim reproduces the linguistic boundaries of 
the past experience. Trauma is consequently part of a cultural package involving a 
range of speech acts, patterns of relationships and assumptions. 
Then she argues that trauma of the past can provide the basis for social practices 
based on habitual memory (125). Memorials, monuments, remembrance days, and 
museums are built as part of a narrative that links a traumatic past with the present 
(Edkins 2003 and 2006; Feuchtwang, 2006). In other words, ‘chosen’ memories of 
trauma can be socially institutionalised and relived and, therefore, become part of 
individual and collective identities (Kinvall, 2002). 
The memory-trauma nexus poses a number of analytical and methodological 
challenges. As both memory and trauma are highly based on individual experiences 
and practices while IR studies focus on the social and collective level in order to 
examine the politics of memory and trauma (Fierke, 2006; Meskell, 2006), the 
fundamental challenge is how to shift from the individual to the communal, social, 
and cultural level. Scholars of memory and trauma have generally addressed this 
challenge in two ways. First, adopting either the Lacanian psychoanalytical   (e.g. 
Edkins, 2006) or constructivist (e.g. Becker, 2014) approach to identity, most of them 
reject the hypothetical separation between individual and collective identities but 
assume their mutually constitutive character. The second way stems from the 
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methodological openings that poststructuralist/postmodernist studies have enabled. 
Since individual and collective identities are mutually constructed in discursive 
contexts, the linguistic (narratives) and non-linguistic materials (monuments, 
memorials, remembrance days) that produce this context are studied as the ways in 
which memory and trauma are collectivised (e.g. Bleiker and Huang, 2006). 
In analysing foreign policy practices, narratives are particularly useful. Narratives are 
‘primary ways by which we make sense of the world aroundus, produce meanings, 
articulate intentions, and legitimise actions’ (Wibben, 2010: 2). In memory of trauma 
studies, they are conceptualised as stories that we tell about ourselves and others by 
articulating meaning of the past for the present and future. They provide a thread 
along which individual and collective identities are (re)constructed. That is why, in 
their study of states’ articulations of narratives of trauma, Innes and Steele (2014: 
17) call these stories ‘(auto)biographical identity narratives’, which are uttered by 
state representatives repeatedly and consistently. Narratives are institutionalised 
stories that articulate what the actor (in our case, the EU) is and what types of 
actions the actor performs.               
While we agree with and take the novelties the studies of memory and trauma have 
introduced on board, we argue that one fundamental dynamic, emotions, that also 
oscillates between individual and social levels by collapsing them into each other is 
neglected (exception, Hutchison, 2016). The role of emotions, to name a few, anger, 
frustration, hate, fear, love, compassion, and pride, are almost always acknowledged 
in the works on memory and trauma in IR (e.g. Ray, 2006). After all, as Bell (2006: 2) 
suggests, social memory is based on ‘affective bonds’ between individuals; as 
Alexander (2004: 1) argues, ‘traumas occur when individuals and groups feel that 
they have been subjected to a horrendous event’. Collective identities are even 
called ‘emotional communities’ (Resende and Budryte, 2014: 8). The role of 
emotions in remembering a traumatic past, which, in this article, we call ‘memory of 
trauma’, cannot be omitted or reduced to simple intervening variables between 
memory and collective identity. Emotional performances in the narratives of policy-
makers do the work of constructing institutional identity in the context of a traumatic 
past. This leads us to reflect on the following: In considering what emotions do 
politically in remembering a traumatic past and how they carry the particular chosen 
past into the present, we ask how is the memory of trauma translated into practice, 
more specifically, foreign policy practice, and in what ways does memory of trauma 
shape international institutions’ identity and agency? We argue that emotions offer 
answers to these questions and these answers can also help address the analytical 
and methodological challenges that memory and trauma studies face.          
Crawford (2000), Mercer (2006 and 2010), and Bleiker and Hutchison (2008) were 
among the first IR scholars who conceptualized emotions. Others followed suit (Moisi 
2007 and 2010; Pain 2009; Sasley 2011; Bially Mattern, 2011).[i]  As there are 
multiple ways of studying emotions and emotional processes in IR, a more concise 
conceptual framework is needed in order to analyse emotions in relation to 
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institutions’ identityand agency in global politics. An emotion is a conscious 
expression or display of a feeling in a historically constructed discursive context 
(Hutchison, 2016: 16). Although they are felt by individuals, ‘feelings are formed and 
structured within particular social and cultural environments’ (Hutchison and Bleiker, 
2014: 504). Discursive context (in our case, the memory of trauma) with its linguistic 
and non-linguistic communication systems is the sphere where feelings are 
consciously expressed as emotions. Narratives of EU practitioners will be the main 
research materials in the second section. 
Emotions cannot be privatised: they are not possessions of individuals (Saeidi and 
Turcotte, 2011: 694). Rather, emotions are constituted by discourse, which refers to 
norms and values of significance that attribute meaning and value. Discourse is 
generated through representations (i.e. habits, customs, languages, practices) which 
are also used to express and communicate feelings (Hutchison, 2016: 139-140). 
Therefore, when a feeling is ‘represented’ (i.e. performed) linguistically or non-
linguistically and articulated as an emotion, this performance is derived from a 
specific discursive context that is, in turn, reconstructed through the emotional 
performance. Through this triangle of emotion-representation-discourse, the actor’s 
agency, meaning, what it can or cannot do, is shaped (Fierke, 2009: 171). As 
opposed to affect and feeling, the concept of emotion takes the analytical scope from 
the individual level towards discursive structures that are historically and politically 
constructed. As the object of the present study is an institution, the EU, we focus on 
the emotional performances of the EU as embodied through its representatives. 
Institutions in politics, and global politics for that matter, are also imbued with 
discourses about what that institution is and its abilities. Therefore, how the EU’s 
representatives express their emotions is derived from the EU’s institutional 
discursive context and signal what the EU is and what it can potentially become. 
Thus, emotions are expressions of ‘the self’ compared to others in a historically and 
politically constructed discursive context; they cannot be easily situated in the 
frameworks that prioritize agency or structure and biology or culture. Rather, they are 
unique experiences that are practiced (Bially Mattern, 2011: 66 and 69). Emotions as 
performances or practices are a technique: ‘how one is experiencing their own 
existence in the world at a given moment’ in relation to others and objects (2011: 73, 
see also Hutchison, 2016). Here, Mattern makes an important point for the key focus 
of our analysis: emotions as practices are not given and external to agents and 
structures, but are a moment of ‘being’ that does not only create agency, but also 
affects social orders (structures). In other words, emotions as practices are not 
independent ontologically from the agent or structure, but are constitutive of them 
(2011: 74).   
Bially Mattern’s analytical framework provides crucial notions about what emotions 
can be, how they do/explain/affect politics, in particular, world politics. Contrary to 
approaches that underestimate agency (physiological), overestimate agency 
(cognitive), or overestimate structure (social, cultural), the practice approach thus 
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reveals how emotions in their own capacity are constitutive both of agency and 
structure. As a result, emotions in their own right can be studied and their 
implications can be revealed without confusingthem with their possible biological or 
social sources. Furthermore, emotions do not just happen, but they are ‘learned’. As 
one of the techniques through which one makes oneself present to others, emotions 
are experienced, recognized, and understood as a result of the continual interaction 
of the being with its environment (2011: 77). Finally, emotions have the potential to 
shape both agency and structures. Individuals are not machines that repeat ‘self-
expressive routines’, but they exceed routines (2011: 74). What type of feelings are 
performed as emotions can be an individual’s choice. This issue will be clarified 
below through our specific case focus. 
EU representatives’ emotional performances in relation to the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict can be understood as a technique of expressing themselves to (internal and 
external) others in the EU’s institutional ‘habitual memory’. These performances can 
be identified as an important, albeit not exclusive, constitutive dimension of EU 
officials’ coping mechanisms in relation to this conflict on a day-to-day basis. EU 
representatives’ emotional performances are certainly learned through the 
experiences of former EU officials with other internal and external others. “What I 
have learned from my predecessor is that our task in this intractable conflict is 
always to try and make the conflict parties see reason … not an easy feat,” 
(interview with former special adviser to Marc Otte, EU Special Representative, 
Middle East Peace Process, Brussels, April 2009). Thus, emotional performances 
are learned within the EU’s social structure, referring to socialized norms or 
tendencies that guide behavior and thinking. However, there are occasions when we 
can observe a change in the way EU representatives perform their emotions (see 
Hutchinson 2016) given the contingent social structure of the conflict. “We are 
absolutely appalled and outraged at the Israeli government for its summer (2014) 
bloody 50-day military attack on the Gaza Strip which resulted in 2145 fatalities, 
including 581 children” (interview with an EU official, Jerusalem, October 2014). 
Therefore, the practice theory of emotions enables an analysis that goes beyond 
showing emotions in communications and representations (i.e. Bleiker and 
Hutchison, 2008) or how they are instrumentalized in political projects (Fattah and 
Fierke, 2009). Rather, a practice approach reveals how the foreign policy of the EU 
(as embodied through the agency of its representatives) is shaped through and 
influenced by emotional performances that can potentially challenge what the EU 
represents at particular junctures, as well as the social order in which EU officials 
interact with others (in our case, Israelis and Palestinians). However, in order to 
engage in this discussion, it is important to bring the ‘identity’ question into the 
analysis, as suggested by Bially Mattern (2011:79). If emotion is a performance of 
‘being’, this is inextricably related to what the self is, can be, and projects itself to be. 
Hence a second conceptual dimension of our framework concerns the role of 
emotions in the construction of identities. If emotions are the ways that the self 
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expresses and communicates its feelings in a historical and political discursive 
context, emotions are inextricably relational. Sara Ahmed’s influential work on 
emotions in politics can be helpful in discussing the emo-tion/identity nexus. 
Ahmed’s main question concerns what emotions do politically, and how. This 
question is relevant and related to Bially Mattern’s problematique, but with less 
emphasis on ontologies of emotions and the ostensible dichotomy between agency 
and structure. Instead, Ahmed’s focus is on identities and power relations in which 
emotions are performed. According to Ahmed, ‘emotions are not simply something ‘I’ 
or ‘we’ have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and 
others, that surfaces or boundaries are made. The ‘I’and ‘we’ are shaped by, and 
even take the shape of, contact with others’ (Ahmed, 2004: 10).  A subject feels 
something in relation to another and this feeling brings about affective reactions. 
These feelings (and affects) are hardly arbitrary; they are derived from experiences 
of history of previous encounters, or rather, from discursive representations of this 
political history. A subject expresses and communicates, or enacts, the feeling either 
through linguistic or non-linguistic practices (Ahmed: 2004, 87-88). Through 
performing an emotion, a subject produces ‘the self’ as the subject who performs 
emotion and ‘the other’ as the object of the emotional performance. Therefore, 
emotional practices become constitutive dynamics of identities and subjectivities 
(Hutchison, 2016: 103). In conclusion, borders are thus (re)drawn between the self 
and the other, and the subject and object through emotional performances. 
When EU representatives express or represent their emotions through 
communicative practices, their emotional performance not only constructs what the 
EU stands for as the self and its agency, but these practices are constitutive of the 
structural dynamics operating within EU institutions and the processes through which 
foreign policy is formulated. This leads us to our final conceptual point about 
emotions in global politics. Emotions can be institutionalized (Crawford, 2014). This 
means that emotions that are discursively expressed by individuals underline the 
way in which institutions are constructed, which in turn engenders a structural effect 
through which emotions can be experienced and how they become ‘represented’. 
Unlike an approach that strategizes and instrumentalizes ‘emotions’ in pursuant of 
the interests of a political institution such as a state, and therefore, ontologically 
separating ‘the self’ as the actor and ‘emotions’ as its tools (Hall, 2015), the 
institutionalization of emotions as defined by Crawford points at a process where 
emotions become constitutive of the construction of a political institution. In this case, 
emotions do not simply reflect institutions as structures, but institutions themselves 
become expressions of emotions, which has implications for what type of agency 
that institution comes to represent. When emotions are institutionalized, they 
become intrinsic to discourses of individuals representing that same institution, who 
‘learn’ how to perform an emotion in the given institutional context. 
However, it must be noted that multiple emotions - some of which can be conflictive 
with each other – can be institutionalized in the same actor’s political practices. This 
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relates to Bially Mattern’s aforementioned point about how we can observe change 
in individuals’ emotional performances. Representatives of political institutions 
sometimes have choices to make about how to express and communicate their 
feelings within the institutional settings at hand. In other words, as Hutchison (2016: 
146) argues, representations also carry a potential to challenge identity and 
agency.  EU representatives’ emotional performances can thus at times express a 
wish for a different kind of EU identity and agency by acting out their emotions 
differently. 
If emotions are contextual, it begs an analytical question about in what context 
emotions are expressed in this specific case study. A way to address this challenge 
surfaced during the empirical research: all sides of the case (EU, Israeli, andoPt 
officials) are bound by a common thread, that is, memory of trauma. 
As the studies on memory show (e.g. Bell, 2006), memory creates affective bonds 
between individuals through emotional appeals (proud about the past, injustice, guilt, 
sense of belonging etc.). Collective identity is, therefore, constructed based on 
collective memory, pieces from the past that are chosen. These affective bonds are 
partly produced through narratives, which are constructed by individuals, 
institutionalised in time and constitutive of the group's identity. Using Fierke’s 
terminology, narratives reflect and shape ‘habitual memory’ of the collectivity and are 
instrumental to formulate foreign policy identity and agency for international actors. 
Becker (2014: 60) argues that narratives create and reinforce a certain image of the 
actor and its foreign policy is formulated and communicated in line with this image. 
We argue that a fundamental way to construct this identity is emotional 
performances of members of institutions. 
When an individual as a member of a community performs an emotion discursively, 
s/he invokes the narrative (in our case, the narrative about the memory of trauma) 
and enacts and reconstructs the community’s collective identity. Narratives with 
emotional underpinnings not only target 'the self' but also express the group's being 
to an/ 'the other' and define the scope of its agency. Through institutionalised 
narratives, emotions become the expression and a communication method of the 
collective self with the outside world. When individuals (EU representatives) perform 
an emotion in relation to the Middle East conflict, this performance stems from the 
institutionalised narrative structure within the EU's foreign policy-making. We argue 
that this narrative structure is constitutive of the memory of trauma, not only of 
Europe's but also others' (the holocaust and nakba) memories of traumatic past. 
Trauma is enacted through emotional performances of individuals (EU 
representatives) who articulate institutionalised narratives. As a result, the EU's 
foreign policy identity (and agency) is reproduced through emotional performances of 
its representatives. 
In this analysis, memory of trauma and emotions appear in two fundamental ways. 
First, the feelings of compassion and sympathy towards the victims of trauma are 
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institutionalized in the EU’s foreign policy agency vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In particular, children, especially those in refugee camps, are often identified 
as victims of trauma. In this way, EU’s representatives construct an identity of the EU 
in relation to the outside world by actively communicating these feelings, and 
therefore, engaging in emotional performativity. However, it must be noted that EU 
representatives’ emotional performances are linked to a deeper historical context: 
memory of past traumas. The second way trauma affects the EU’s foreign policy 
identity and agency relates to the respective memories of past traumatic experiences 
of EU, Israeli and Palestinian representatives, which are interconnected. The latter 
two groups frequently refer to their own traumatic experiences, the holocaust and the 
“nakba” respectively, in their dealings with the EU. Mistrust towards the EU, 
victimhood, and injustice appear to be the main feelings associated with their 
respective traumatic pasts. The EU’s own traumatic past, World War II, the holocaust 
and the ensuing “nakba”, is often associated with feelings of guilt and shame, as the 
interview material will show below. When either Israelis or Palestiniansmake 
analogies between the EU’s policy and the past (the holocaust or nakba), EU 
representatives often express ‘shock’. EU representatives’ emotional performances 
below express the EU’s ‘self’ towards ‘the Other’ by redrawing the boundaries 
between the EU and Israel or Palestine. The EU is very often articulated as 
compassionate and sympathetic towards the parties, especially those who are 
identified as ‘the most vulnerable groups’, because of their respective traumatic 
experiences, but we also observe shifts in these emotional performances.  
The EU’s identity and emotional performativity in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict 
In their work on the international identity of the EU, Manners and Whitman focus on 
the active and reflexive dimensions of the EU’s attempts to assert its identity on the 
international scene (Manners and Whitman, 1998 and 2003). Building on their earlier 
‘premise that Europe, Western Europe, the European Union and its member states 
represent a set of varied but interrelated identities constructed and represented 
through different means and mechanisms’ (Ibid. 1998: 236) they argue that the 
international identity of the EU is ‘based on addition – the addition of identities, 
processes, communication and socio-political networks’ (Manners and Whitman 
2003: 400). We wish to add the role that emotional performativity of EU 
representatives plays in the EU’s collective identity formation. In the case of the EU, 
the constitution of its very “being”, its origins and foundations have been built on 
narratives / memory of a collective and overwhelming traumatic experience – the 
ruins and aftermath of the first and second World Wars (Bottici and Challand 2013; 
Kattago 2012). This past casts its shadow on the present of Europe (as represented 
through the EU and its political representatives) as an ugly reminder of the dark side 
of modernity (Kattago, 2012). Here a link emerges between Europe’s past, the birth 
of Israel and the Palestinians’ ‘nakba’ (meaning, catastrophe): all collectives of 
Europeans, Israelis and Palestinians have been through deeply traumatic 
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experiences and ensuing memories and narratives thereof, with their respective 
subjective interpretations of said events. 
The traumatic past influences how the EU frames the Israel-Palestine conflict. As 
Entman (2004) argues, framing is the process of selecting some aspects of a 
perceived reality and (making) them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular narrative, problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation and or treatment / recommendation of the item described. However, 
if there are emotional shifts, that is for instance less positive emotional leanings (as 
discursively uttered by EU representatives) towards for instance the Israeli 
government, which are at particular moments replaced by others, this is constitutive 
of an imagined new EU self and its agency, in addition to the social order in which it 
interacts with others. When Prime Minister Netanyahu condemned the EU’s initiative 
to label certain goods produced beyond the Green Line as similar to what happened 
during the holocaust, Ambassador Lars Faaborg-Andersen, EU envoy to Israel, 
responded: 
I have been shocked to hear claims of anti-Semitism and historic comparisons or 
analogies to the persecution of Jews in Germany in the 1930s and 40s … In my 
view, this is a distortion of history and a belittlement of the crimes of the Nazis and of 
the memory of their victims … The bond between Europe and Israel is unbreakable 
and indispensable and for the most part, our relations are consensual and thriving. 
But it is no secret that we do not agree on all points. Yet even where we do not 
agree it is important to keep a sense of proportion and not to confuse fact with 
fiction. (Quoted in Ahren, 2015, italics added)[ii] 
In other words, the emotional self-expressions of EU representatives may at times 
change the image or representation of the EU’s foreign policy and symbolize what 
these representatives  wish the EU would aspire to become in a changing social 
order. In the quote above, Lars Faaborg Andersen is very clear in his wish to see the 
EU stand firm in terms of its principles of what is right and wrong: settlements are 
illegal according to international law and this is what the EU stands for – respect for 
international norms. What is crucial for the present analysis is the way this EU 
representative performs this emotion: he was ‘shocked’ because memory of the EU’s 
traumatic past was re-articulated in a ‘distorted’ way (with the implication that 
Europeans have repeated the same practices of the traumatic past). Thus, this 
emotional performance not only re-constructs the EU’s identity as markedly different 
from the past it emerged from, but also constructs its foreign policy as having 
normative law abiding agency. 
For EU representatives, the memory of World War II has been a crucial phenomenon 
that affects the way they emotionally perform in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Questions of criminality, guilt, and collaboration have intersected with history 
and politics on the local level to shape the way that wartime experience has been 
memorialized, reinterpreted, and used (Chirot et al, 2014). World War II continues to 
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influence generations of EU officials, their attitudes and politics vis-à-vis Israel and 
the oPt on a very broad scale. During interviews in Brussels by one of the authors, a 
number of EU elites elaborated on the challenges they face in handling memories 
and reflections about guilt especially in the context of the holocaust and the creation 
of the Israeli Palestinian issue. These personal narratives suggest that when we 
reflect about the EU representatives’ emotional performances in this case we need 
to take into account the war's legacy and the continuing impact of memory of trauma 
on EU elites. As one official put it: 
The Second World War evokes powerful emotions and in relation to the holocaust 
and the creation of the Middle East conflict in particular, grief and humiliation, 
outrage, guilt, shame and pain. Such feelings have formed essential parts of national 
mythologies across EU member states. And such embedded emotions often leave 
us speechless in the face of atrocities that continue up to this day in Israel and 
Palestine …” (interview held with an official from the Middle East section, European 
External Action Service, Brussels, 13th June, 2011). 
Although memories across EU member states may, as already stated above, not 
necessarily be similar and shared myths about these traumatic events, they do have 
an affect on the emotional performativity of diverse EU officials from the European 
Parliament, Council or Commission but particularly on EU representatives in Israel 
and the oPt. ‘Speechlessness’ may well be an effect of trauma although EU 
representatives often issue strong statements urging parties to the conflict to stop 
the violence and to return to the negotiating table. The author carrying out the 
fieldwork for this article also observed a difference in the emotional performativity (of 
these EU officials based on the ground) when speaking in an unofficial capacity: 
The situation here (in the oPt) is truly a cause for alarm. Breaches of international 
law related to the Israeli military occupation take place on a regular basis and in a 
variety of ways, including frequent collective punishment, confiscation of land, 
exploitation of water resources, home demolitions, restrictions on the freedom of 
movement and goods, administrative detentions, and the harassment, psychological 
trauma and torture of Palestinian detainees and prisoners. The presence of Israel’s 
military, the continual establishment of illegal Israeli settlements, and the separation 
barriers create a daily dangerous and inhumane environment for Palestinians in 
which children and women are particularly vulnerable. The significant increase in the 
detention of children and the recent law by the Israeli Parliament to lower the age of 
detainees is especially troubling,” (interview with an official from the Office of the EU 
Representative in Jerusalem, October 2014, own emphasis). 
Therefore not only history, but also the daily experience of living in the oPt,  and the 
ways in which EU officials emotionally perform their experiences give academic 
observers different political categories that reflect the affect dimension in the EU’s 
agency as represented by its elites (see also Demertzis, 2013). 
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From thepart of Israelis, Newman and Yacobi (2008) have argued that the general 
critique stemming from Israel about the EU’s agency in the Israel-Palestine issue 
continues to reflect deeply-rooted feelings of mistrust amongst the Israeli (Jewish) 
public vis-à-vis Europe and Europeans in general. These feelings have historical 
associations for most Israelis with experiences of persecution and holocaust. As Uri 
Avnery of Gush Shalom in Tel Aviv (quoted in Broadhead and Keown, 2007: 29 ) 
wrote: 
The holocaust overshadows everything the Israeli people think and do. Our attitude 
is conditioned by the Holocaust. It conditions Israel to justify any means because 
compared with the Holocaust any bad things we do are negligible by comparison. It 
is a standard of comparison, which gives a kind of moral permit to do anything. In a 
way we are still victims of the Holocaust today but in a different way. It twists our 
outlook on things ... (Moreover), Israelis have a self-protective habit: when 
confronted with inconvenient truths, they evade its essence and deal with a 
secondary, unimportant aspect. 
Therefore, the cycle of emotional performativity sets in: with Israeli or Palestinian 
rejection of ‘inconvenient truths’, we observe underlying emotions associated with 
their memory of collective traumas or what some have earlier termed 
‘sociopsychological barriers’ that perpetuate the distorted and eroded interpretation 
of every event and every statement in the conflict from both sides (Ross and Ward, 
1995; Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011). 
The ways in which Israelis and Palestinians relate to European countries show a 
deeply embedded relationship between the respective collective’s identity and their 
emotional performativity thereof: Perceptions of Europe as ‘anti-Semitic’ continue to 
strive amongst the majority of the Israeli public and become strengthened through 
increasing ‘anti-Semitic’ incidents against Jewish communities and synagogues 
throughout Europe (Pardo and Peters 2010; Pardo 2015). As a result of these deeply 
embedded perceptions on Europe, in the eyes of many Israelis there is no distinction 
between antisemitism and anti-Zionism - which has long been part of the 
Palestinians’ national and political discourse, crucial in demarcating a sharp line 
between racism and opposition to a political ideology (settler colonialism, among 
other see Hage, 2015). And for Jews, Israel is an act of national redemption and 
many Palestinians will agree that they should be accorded the same respect as any 
other national/ethnic group (interviews carried out by one of the authors, May/June 
2016. See also Khalidi, 2016). 
For Palestinians, Britain’s Balfour Declaration plays a huge role in their ‘nakba’, 
dispossession and loss of their homeland. As recent as July 2016, the Palestinian 
leader Mahmood Abbas called for Palestinians to sue the British government over 
the Balfour declaration of November 1917 (Black,2016). In the eyes of many 
Palestinians the UN’s decision to partition Palestine was an emotional response to 
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the horrors of the holocaust but ‘under more ‘normal’ circumstances, the compelling 
claims to sovereignty of the Palestinian majority would have prevailed. 
“Western allies’ reaction of guilt is understandable, but that does not mean the 
Palestinians should have to pay for crimes committed by others—a classic example 
of two wrongs not making a right” (interviews carried out with a focus group 
Bethlehem, May/June 2016). The feeling of victimhood and anger that this reaction 
fuels does not simply concern the Palestinians paying the price of the Western guilt. 
Reproduction of ‘Palestinians’ as ‘Arabs’ in the Israeli discourse and resistance of 
the ‘outsider’ such as ‘Europeans’ to understand this identity construction process (of 
Palestinians labelled as Arabs) has fed the feelings of injustice and victimhood. As 
Israeli leader, Moshe Dayan, was quoted as admitting: 
We came to this country which was already populated by Arabs, and we are 
establishing a Hebrew, that is a Jewish, state here...Jewish villages were built in the 
place of Arab villages...There is not a single community in the country that did not 
have a former Arab population” (in Beit-Hallahmi, 1993: 114). 
Many Palestinian participants who self-identify as Palestinians themselves (rather 
than as Arabs) acknowledge this as an archaism from the mid-20th century that 
Palestinians themselves resist using. ‘First, and in general, surely, the term that an 
ethnic or national group uses to designate itself is preferable to the terms that its 
‘antagonists’ have historically used to designate it. Secondly, and what is at stake 
here, is not merely rhetoric, but a form of historical distortion that makes it all but 
impossible for outsiders to fully grasp the nature of the conflict’ (interviews carried 
out with a focus group Bethlehem, May/June 2016). In their eyes, their plight for their 
self-identification remains unaddressed performing the feeling of injustice. 
The question of what kind of EU identity they wish for is therefore heavily intertwined 
with the agency of EU representatives and how they navigate around the various 
sensitivities of Israelis and Palestinians on a day-to-day basis. We observe that 
through emotional performativity, the ways that past and present traumatic 
experiences are memorialised and performed can be quite similar across our 
observations of EU representatives, Israeli and Palestinian officials. Although the 
main emotion often associated with Europeans’ memory of the trauma of WWII and 
the holocaust is one of guilt (and shame); for Israeli Jews, fear, insecurity, 
uncertainty and anxiety about the present and the future; and for Palestinians, a very 
strong sense of injustice and victimhood, we also observe Palestinians experiencing, 
expressing and identifyingwith emotions of anxiety, insecurity, fear and uncertainty. 
Similarly, as expressed in our interview quotations earlier, EU officials also identify 
with emotions of uncertainty and insecurity in regard to the situation on the ground in 
the oPt and Israel. And Israelis often perform anger at their historical injustice and 
victimhood. 
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Europeans and some Israeli Jews also share a similar technic of how to address the 
memory of trauma. This technic, already eluded to earlier is one of being speechless 
because pain, shame and guilt of being unable to prevent the traumatic experience. 
The key effect of trauma is thus a form of speechlessness. For example, in some 
Israeli families, youth members told one of the authors about how their parents never 
speak with them about the pain they and their parents had experienced during the 
Holocaust. When asked why this is so, they told her that most probably their parents 
are ashamed on behalf of their own parents that the Jews at the time ‘did not do 
enough’ to save themselves. When interviewing German EU representatives in the 
oPt in an unofficial capacity there is often reference to the German shame of “The 
mass murder of six million Jews, carried out in the name of Germany, (that) has 
brought indescribable suffering to the Jewish people, Europe and the entire world. 
We therefore try to leave it behind us and focus on positive engagements with both 
Israelis and Palestinians here” (interviews held at the Representative office of 
Germany, Ramallah, October, 2016).  
Conceptually, this speechlessness is carefully explained by Hutchison (2016: 80) 
who, through her thorough and extensive academic and interdisciplinary literature 
excavation, suggests that the challenge of expressing trauma is best reflected by a 
common response to it: speechlessness or what she refers to as silence. In the case 
of one of the author’s interviewees, their parents' speechlessness resonates pain 
which no amount of words can explain. This very speechlessness can speak louder 
than words: it reflects how Israelis ‘struggle to free what becomes trapped by 
language: the emotional dimensions of one’s self that have been marked, inimitably, 
by their experiences’ (Hutchison 2016: 76-78). Fassin (2008) argues that memory of 
trauma becomes a political argument through which the experience of both 
Palestinians and Israelis as victims becomes shared (See also Fassin and 
Rechtman, 2009; Perugini, 2014). EU officials acknowledge this: “Jews were victims 
of the Holocaust, Palestinians are victims of the ‘nakba’, we today are victims of what 
our ancestors decided many decades ago … it is all very frustrating really … In some 
moments I get very depressed here. It’s like being in a vicious circle” (interview with 
an official from an EU Member State representative office, Ramallah, October 2016). 
It is with emotions performed thus that this EU official constructs the EU as an often 
helpless actor in the status quo of this intractable conflict. 
However, this helplessness is sometimes addressed through another emotional 
performance: enacting a compassionate EU towards the most vulnerable groups to 
trauma. As one Member of the European Parliament told one of the authors: 
We are known as the payers in this conflict … Since 1971 the European Community 
has been making financial contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNWRA).,,We also provide 
assistance for recreational activities in schools and in refugee camps in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, we target children aged six to fourteen, many of them 
traumatized from the ongoing conflict. We cannot ignore these children. Yet another 
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generation is facing the trauma of lost homes and family members ... We also 
finance and help facilitate the movement of ambulances within the occupied 
Palestinian territories and the monitoring of the humanitarian situation, particularly in 
areas under closures and curfews, as well as visits to detainees and communication 
with their families' (interview with a Member of the European Parliament, East 
Jerusalem, October 2016, own emphasis). 
The way that EU representatives relate their own emotions to this intractable conflict 
is thus to emphasize the experience of those most vulnerable – children. Through 
this emotional performativity that expresses the EU’s being and communicates it with 
others, the said MEP constructs the EU’s identity as an actor that cares about what 
really matters in this conflict: vulnerable children, through psychological support to 
deal with their trauma of conflict and war. Accordingly, the EU’s agency is formulated 
as a caring “being” assisting the most vulnerable. 
On another occasion, another official from the EP elaborated on this point: 
From my various field visits to both Israel and the oPt, I can see that  it is the 
subjective experience of all the children (that I met on both sides) of the objective 
events that they face every day that constitutes their trauma…The more they 
intrinsically believe that they are endangered, the more traumatized they 
are…Particularly in Palestinian refugee camps, the bottom line is an overwhelming 
emotion and a feeling of utter helplessness of these children and their close 
relatives. We are very concerned that this plays a leading role in the long-range 
effects” (interview held at the EP, Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, Policy Department, Brussels, February 2016). 
It is therefore extremely important to understand and nuance these emotional 
performances (see also Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010) in order to understand the 
EU’s agency when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Theseemotional 
performances are not simply diplomatic tools of ‘rational’ actors with their pre-defined 
identity; rather, they are expressions of institutionalised feelings that express the 
EU’s being to others, and therefore, reconstruct its identity and agency.  Hence, what 
we want to shed light on here is on how the way in which emotions associated with 
memories of trauma are performed by EU officials is linked to the EU’s collective 
identity vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict and by extension and potentially also as a 
global actor.       
Conclusion 
This article has addressed a neglected question in IR in general and EU studies in 
particular: what role do emotions play in the praxis of institutions and what impact do 
emotions have on institutional agency and identity? Focusing on the case of EU 
representatives’ practices in the context of the prolonged Middle East conflict, it has 
been argued that the EU’s identity and foreign policy agency has been (and 
continues to be) (re)constructed through its representatives’ emotional performances 
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which are, in turn, institutionalized within the EU’s foreign policy structures. When 
referring to EU representatives, we have extended the analytical scope of our work 
from EU officials based mainly in Brussels to those who are on the ground in Israel 
or the oPt as the latter are directly and more emotionally faced with the day to day 
challenges that living in conflict zone entails. Three conclusions can be derived from 
this discussion: 
First, while drawing upon different, and adding to existing, academic approaches to 
the study of emotions in politics, the article provides readers with an analytical 
framework to study emotions and institutions in world politics. We have made the 
point that emotions as performances are also about the construction of the Self’s 
identity. 
Second, our discussion here has highlighted that EU representatives’ emotional 
performances are not ‘private’ but political in the sense that they are institutionalized 
in the EU’s foreign policy structures. 
Third, the analytical focus on memory of trauma (through the emotions associated 
with trauma as process) has facilitated a new perspective for studying the 
EU’sforeign policy vis- à -vis the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Emotions of mistrust, 
victimhood, injustice, guilt, and shame that are performed by the parties are 
contextualized in their memory of traumatic pasts and subjective articulations of their 
respective histories. We acknowledged that although not all EU member states may 
necessarily share the same national mythologies about historically traumatic events, 
these strongly influence how representatives perceive ‘the Other’. This analysis has 
again shown that emotions are more than simply ‘socio-psychological barriers’ but 
rather techniques of expressing ‘the self’ to the outside world.   
Our aim in this article has been to instigate a more nuanced discussion between the 
emotions literature in International Relations and the European Union studies 
literature to further understanding of the politics of emotions that increasingly 
constrain what kind of a global actor the EU actually is or can become. We hope that 
by critically engaging with both literatures and by shedding light on the specific case 
of the EU in the Middle East conflict we have shown that due attention needs to be 
given to the role that emotional performativity of EU officials plays in the EU’s 
collective identity formation. Building on our work here, future research could explore 
how EU representatives’ emotional performativity may or may not help in bringing 
about positive transformation in this intractable conflict. 
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[i] The role of emotions in conflicts and conflict resolution processes have been 
studied in the Israeli-Palestinian prolonged conflict (among others, Halperin and 
Pliskin, 2015). The aforementioned literature studies emotions as ‘variables’ between 
reified or fixed societal identities, not how emotions work in the construction of ‘the 
self’, of dichotomist identities, and how emotions as ‘performances’ challenge such 
identities. 
[ii] Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/eu-envoy-comparing-labeling-to-
holocaust-cheapens-memory/ (Accessed 19.01.2017) 
 
